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The Neo-Fascist Discourse and its Normalisation Through Mediation 
Bart Cammaerts 




In this article, I set out to deconstruct the main nodal points of the neo-fascist discourse, using a multi-
cultural political discourse analysis of Trump and Modi. Subsequently, mechanisms of the normalisation of 
the neo- fascist discourse will be discussed. I will argue that mediation plays a pivotal role in this process, 
which implicates both traditional as well as social media. Central to the normalisation of neo-fascism is a 
politics of provocation and a deep-rooted cultivation of victimhood. Whereas media and neo fascist politics 
often operate in an antagonistic relationship, neo-fascists create drama, emotion and consternation, which 
works well in the context of the current business model of media. Likewise, social media also profit from 
the self-mediation practices of neo-fascism. Using radical democratic theory and normative media and 
communication theory, I argue that journalists and social media companies have a moral duty to combat 
neo-fascism and its normalisation. 
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Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those 
who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, 
then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. […] we should claim the right to suppress them if 
necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational 
argument, but begin by denouncing all argument. 
 




Neo-fascism1 is a contemporary political phenomenon, rooted in an unsavoury past, which 
combines ultra-nationalism with nativism and celebrates racial hierarchy, as well as the 
desirability of inequality and privilege. It furthermore propagates an anti-intellectualism 
denouncing facts and expert knowledge, whilst persistently propagating blatant lies. Neo-
fascism also cultivates victimhood vis-à-vis those that dare to critique them, and an anti-
enlightenment agenda which actively undermines democratic institutions and values by using 
democracy against democracy (Cammaerts, 2018a; Stanley, 2018).  
 
In the epigraph, published at the end of the second World War, Karl Popper articulated what 
he called the Paradox of Tolerance. The recent worldwide rise of neo-fascism, as well as the 
prevalence of persistent strategic lying and ‘denouncing all argument’ in political discourse, 
makes Popper’s paradox resonate again, unfortunately. Mark Twain is proclaimed to have said 
at some point that ‘history doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme’. Indeed, fascism as it presents 
itself today is a much different beast from what it was in the 1930s and 1940s, which is why 
direct historical comparisons never quite work, but at the same time there are many continuities 
and vigilance is always necessary. Especially as contemporary fascism has managed to 
transform that which was deemed to be unacceptable and politically repugnant only a short 
time ago into the new ‘common sense’. It is paradoxically fascist ideology, practices and 
discourse that have been most successful at achieving the cultural revolution Antonio Gramsci 
talked about, turning fringe counter-hegemony into hegemony. They managed to ‘transform 
the morally extraordinary into the ordinary’ and to make people ‘tolerate what was once 
intolerable by making it seem as if this is the way things have always been’ (Stanley, 2018: 
220). 
 
Through a political and multi-cultural discourse analysis of contemporary rightwing politics in 
two of the largest democracies in the world, the Unites States and India, I aim to demonstrate 
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that rightwing politics has moved firmly in the direction of fascist and extreme right ideology, 
shifting more and more from a democratic agonistic adversary into an anti-democratic 
antagonistic enemy. I will furthermore argue that the mediation opportunity structure 
(Cammaerts, 2012) plays a central role in this mainstreaming and normalisation of neo-fascist 
discourses and solutions to contemporary societal problems. All this has serious consequences 
for democracy and for those that feel morally compelled to defend an open, participatory and 
inclusive democracy which not only protects freedoms, but also strives towards equality for all 
and respect for universal human rights. By mobilising theories of radical democracy and 
normative media and communication theory, I will argue that social media companies and 
journalists alike should seriously reflect on their normative and democratic duties in these dire 
and dangerous political times. In doing so, I align myself with a long-standing anti-fascist 
legacy (Traverso, 2004). As such this article has, unavoidably and necessarily, a political and 
polemic character, because in the face of fascism, neutrality and nuance amounts to complicity 
in its normalisation. 
 
 
Method and Case Selection 
 
Just as there are various conceptualisations of what constitutes discourse and what discourse 
does, a wide variety of competing and partially overlapping discourse analytical methods is 
available to us (cf. Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Gee and Handford, 2012). This is, however, 
not the space to discuss the differences and tensions between these various approaches. In this 
article, a political discourse analysis is used, building on the work of Derrida (1978), as well 
as Laclau and Mouffe (1985). This was deemed to be conceptually productive in order to 
deconstruct the neo-fascist discourse because they situate identity, differentiation, equivalences 
and naturalisation or hegemony quite central within the analysis of political discourse. This 
approach also posits, just as Orwell did, that meaning making is dynamic and ontologically 
instable and malleable, which will prove to be highly relevant in the context of analysing neo-
fascist discourse. Besides this neo-Gramscian approach, the discourse historical approach of 
Wodak (2015) is equally useful, especially as it pertains to the analysis of fascism, racism and 
extreme right ideology. This approach also allows us to consider a wide variety of genres of 
discourse into the corpus. Finally, also very pertinent to the study of the fascist discourse, and 
above all its spread beyond Western societies, is a multi-culturalist perspective on discourse, 
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acknowledging both the convergences and divergences in the various manifestations of 
contemporary neo-fascism across the world (Shi-xu, 2012).  
 
As implied, the recent surge of neo-fascist discourse, politics and action within mainstream 
rightwing politics is a global, but not necessarily universal, phenomenon. In order to study this, 
it was decided to focus on two of the largest democracies in the world, one situated in the East, 
and the other in the West. In the largest democracy in the world with more than 830 million 
voters, the Indian People's Party (BJP) has been in power since 2014. The strictly hierarchically 
structured Hindu-nationalist BJP is led by Narenda Modi, a charismatic but highly 
controversial leader, accused (amongst others) of inciting a racial pogrom of Muslims in 2002 
in the state of Gujarat. The United States is the largest democracy of the Western world, with 
about 250 million people who hold the right to vote. In 2016, the Republican party choose 
Donald J. Trump as its presidential candidate which was the result of a broader and more long-
term internal radicalisation of that party. Since then and the subsequent election of Trump, the 
Republican party as a whole has arguably hardened, sliding ever more to the extreme right. 
The corpus for analysis was constructed by sampling social media postings as well as political 
speeches and interviews of both leaders.  
 
 
The Core Nodal Points of Neo-Fascist Discourse 
 
Neo-fascism varies from one country to the next, from one part of the world to the other, in 
large part due to distinct political cultures, customs, and historical trajectories. This makes it 
particularly challenging to deconstruct contemporary articulations of neo-fascism in a 
comparative perspective. Nevertheless, a multi-cultural comparative analysis is important and 
is fruitful in exposing convergences, but also divergences. Building on Michael Billig’s (1989) 
research on far-right ideology and myth-making, and Jason Stanley’s (2018) analysis of the 
workings of fascist ideology, it is possible to discern a set of discursive nodal points which 
taken together (i.e. not in isolation), represent the signifying chain of neo-fascist discourse. In 
what follows, the following nodal points, 1) ultra-nationalism, religion and nativism; 2) 
hierarchy, inequality and superiority; 3) anti-intellectualism, lies and conspiracy theories and 
4) anti-enlightenment and anti-democratic values, will be theorised and analysed, using the 
political discourse of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi and US president Donald J. Trump 
as case studies. 
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Ultra-Nationalism, Religion and Nativism 
 
One of the most important nodal points in fascist ideology is an ultra-nationalism combined 
with nativism, whereby the latter strives towards homogenisation and espouses the view ‘that 
states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group’ (Mudde, 2007: 19). 
Both nationalism and xenophobic nativism construct clear boundaries between ‘the self’ and 
‘the other’, between ‘us’ and ‘them’. From a discourse theory perspective, the self is 
constructed in juxtaposition to its ‘constitutive outside’ (Derrida, 1978, p. 39-44). As such, a 
discursive chain of equivalence ties together the in-group through a logic of difference (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985: 127). Nationalism, as well as religion, are powerful ways to construct such 
a strong chain of equivalence, which on the one hand erases internal differences but at the same 
time accentuates external differences and establishes insurmountable boundaries with various 
out-groups. Nativism, then, adds race to this ‘us’ versus ’them’ juxtaposition and it thus also 
represents an active rejection of and resistance against pluralist, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic 
and multi-faith societies (Billig, 1989: 147). As Stanley (2018) explains in great detail, this is 
often coupled with a deep-rooted sense of nostalgia towards a mythical glorious past when the 
nation was supposedly more racially homogenous, patriarchal and heteronormative.  
 
Trump embodies this with a wide range of ultra-nationalist discourses, pandering to white 
nativism. The slogan and corresponding meme ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) 
encapsulates a promise to ‘bring back a past Eden, a Golden Age’ (Lakoff, 2017: 602). Besides 
nationalism, religion is also central to the contemporary neo-fascist discourse, especially as it 
serves to strengthen the identity of ‘the self’ vis-à-vis a demonised and dehumanised ‘other’. 
In 2017, Trump retweeted some incendiary anti-Islam messages from Jayda Fransen, the 
deputy leader of the UK fascist party Britain First. One of them read, ‘VIDEO: Muslim migrant 
beat up Dutch boy on crutches’ (@JayddaBF, 28/11/2017). The Dutch Prosecution Service, 
however, countered this claim by stating that the attacker was not an immigrant, but ‘born and 
raised in the Netherlands' (@OMNoord_Holland, 29/11/2017) and neither was he a Muslim. 
 
In Hindu nationalist India, religion and nationalism are joining hands even more firmly than in 
the US context. This is accompanied by an active rewriting of official history to fit Hindutva 
ideology, which advocates Hindu dominance and justifies policies to establish a pure Hindu 
nation and preserve the caste-system (Thapar, 2019). During the latest 2019 election campaign, 
Modi asked for the extreme right Hindutva ideologue Veer Savarkar to be awarded the highest 
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civilian award in India, highlighting that ‘nationalism be kept the root of nation-building’ 
(Modi, quoted in The Week, 2019: np). Following on from this, anyone who is critical of Modi, 
the BJP and the idea of Hindu supremacy is subsequently positioned as anti-national and 
denoted as a traitor.  
 
What both cases expose here is that a complex and above all conflictual relationship is being 
constructed between race, ethnicity, religion, class and the nation, expressed through a 
discourse of exclusion and inequality geared towards identity construction, but importantly 
historically, culturally and politically specific (Shi-xu, 2012: 649).  
 
Hierarchy, Inequality and Superiority 
 
The second cluster of nodal points of the neo-fascist discourse foregrounds the celebration of 
(racial) hierarchy and thus also the idea that inequality and privilege are not only inevitable, 
but desirable. As Saalfeld (1993: 181) argues, neo-fascism rests on ‘a belief in the necessity 
and legitimacy of institutionalised social and political inequality, based on criteria such as 
nationality, race, ethnic group, gender, personal achievement and social background’. 
 
By adhering to a Darwinian conception of nature which foregrounds competition and the 
survival of the strong and fit to the detriment of the weak, equality is deemed to be an unnatural 
state of affairs. As already illustrated above, religion also often serves as a proxy to establish 
racial superiority. One can think of how Judaism and more recently Islam are being targeted 
by fascists. All this serves as a justification for the privileged and superior status of the 
dominant ‘native’ in-group vis-à-vis various out-groups. Relevant in this regard is the 
prevalence of a differentialist racism at the heart of fascist ideology (Taguieff, 1993). It relates 
the in-group to the out-groups as intrinsically incompatible, thus stressing the ontological 
impossibility and above all undesirability of an equal multi-cultural society.  
 
Trump’s racist tweets, telling four non-white Congresswomen who are critical of him to ‘go 
back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came’ 
(@realDonaldTrump, 14 July 2019), speaks to the idea that even if most of them are US-born 
citizens, they do not belong and most importantly will never belong; they are considered to be 
what the ancient Greeks would call allochthones – i.e. not from here. This is part of a broader 
discursive attempt to frame these female congresswomen of colour as un-American, 
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unpatriotic, and disrespectful. A few months after the ‘go back home’ tweet, Trump retweeted 
the false claim made by conservative comedian Terrence K Williams that Ilhan Omar, one of 
the four congress women he targeted, ‘partied on the anniversary of 9/11’ (@w_terrence, 
16/09/2019). Such racist discourses have genuine material consequences and Omar reported a 
marked increase in death threats from people feeling emboldened by the persistent nods to the 
discourse of differential racism by US president Trump (McCarthy, 2019). The re-tweeting 
behaviour of Trump should be seen as part of a longstanding tradition in rightwing America of 
dog whistle politics, or ‘coded racial appeals that carefully manipulate hostility toward 
nonwhites’ (López, 2014: 12), but crucially whilst also claiming to be morally opposed to 
racism. 
 
Modi and the BJP’s anti-Muslim discourse and policies are well-documented (Banaji, 2018), 
and just like Trump, he also tends to resort to dog whistle politics. For example, after fierce 
protests against the new Citizenship Amendment Act in various part of India at the end of 2019, 
Modi specifically targeted protests in the North East of India, where large parts of the 
population are Muslim and protests turned violent. In his public speech, he noted in passing 
that ‘Those who are creating violence can be identified by their clothes itself’2. A few months 
later, during and after the visit of Trump to India, he refused to condemn the gruesome anti-
Muslim violence and the purge of Muslim Indians out of certain neighbourhoods of New Delhi 
(Ellis-Petersen, 2020). These events also speak to the idea that discourse is not merely 
symbolic, but has serious material consequences3. Inequality and poverty is also presented as 
inevitable by Modi, and religiously justified as the will of god. In this regard, Modi (2007) 
once wrote that manual scavenging, an activity pre-dominantly executed by the lowest Dalit 
cast in India, amounted to ‘a spiritual experience’ and he also frequently defends the 
institutional inequality and hierarchy inherent to the caste-system.  
 
What these discursive examples show is that ideas of inequality, hierarchy, religion and racism 
in the two contexts under consideration are not essentialist nor inter-changeable. In line with 
this, religion and casts as cultural belongings can easily signify a proxy for biological 
belongings, as Hall (2017: 154) also pointed out when he stated that ‘emphasis on cultural 
belonging does not silence the biological, and certainly does not eliminate the genetic-physical 
signifiers of racial difference and their discursive effects’. 
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Anti-intellectualism, Lies and Conspiracy Theories 
 
The third cluster of nodal points of contemporary fascism consists of anti-intellectualism, a 
high propensity of blatant lying and the promotion of conspiracy theories. Anti-intellectualism 
– or what Ruth Wodak (2015: 22) calls the ‘arrogance of ignorance’ – can amongst others be 
seen in the rejection of objective facts and the delegitimization of science, experts and 
expertise. Facts are denied by countering them with ‘alternative facts’, as Trump’s Counsellor 
Kellyanne Conway put it, which is reminiscent of Guy Debord’s (1967 [1981]) topsy-turvy 
Society of the Spectacle in which ‘the true’ has truly become ‘a moment of the false’. We could 
in this regard also argue that neo-fascist newspeak has taken post-structuralist critiques of 
absolute truth claims and legitimate knowledge construction to its ultimate extreme, rendering 
literally everything into empty signifiers, amounting to what some have called a post-truth or 
bullshit politics (Ball, 2017; Lakoff, 2017).  
 
One specific articulation of this denial of truth ‘all together’ can be found in the way fascist 
political forces have always developed, distributed and promoted a whole range of wild 
conspiracy theories, which befit their world-view and target their ideological and/or ethnic 
enemies. A conspiracy theory ‘either misattributes dominance to individuals, or simplistically 
places blame for the ills of the world on individuals rather than on underlying, structural causes’ 
(Fenster, 1999: 58). However, while the focus is often on individuals, for example George 
Soros today, the real target are not these individuals per se, but rather the ethno-religious or 
ideological groups they belong to, for example Freemasons, (cultural) Marxists, Jews, and 
more recently Muslims. The conspiracy theory operates at a rhetorical level and is 
argumentative; it is designed to disrupt common knowledge by providing a secret explanation 
to which only those ‘in the know’ have access to. As Billig (1988: 29) points out, ‘in claiming 
to have discovered the hidden truth about the world, [the conspiracy theorist] is offering an 
argument against ordinary, non-conspiratorial interpretations of the world’.  
 
A large part of Trump’s political capital was built on actively promoting conspiracy theories, 
as well as those that pander them, for example Alex Jones of Infowars. Before his 2016 
election, Trump became the most prominent spokesperson for the so-called birthers, who 
falsely claimed that Barak Obama was a Muslim, born in Kenya, and thus an illegitimate 
president (Sides et al., 2018). The way in which Trump promotes conspiracy theories is often 
by insinuation, or by giving exposure and credibility to those that overtly pander them. For 
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example, after Obama released his birth certificate, Trump went on CNN and stated that ‘a lot 
of people do not think it was an authentic certificate’ (Interview CNN, 29 May 2012), whilst 
refusing to disclose who these people are. Besides feeding a variety of conspiracy theories, 
Trump is also a compulsive and some argue pathological liar. The Washington Post calculated 
that by January 2020, three years into his presidency, Trump had made more than 16.000 claims 
and statements that were either false or misleading (The Washington Post, 2020). This also 
speaks and relates to a broader overall disdain and rejection of expertise, intellectuals and 
scientific knowledge within the neo-fascist discourse. Trump and his administration have from 
the very beginning implemented an anti-science agenda, which expressed itself most clearly in 
the context of climate change and health policy. When asked by reporters for a reaction on the 
conclusion by the National Climate Assessment (NCA) report that the US economy would 
suffer considerably due to climate change, Trump responded by saying: ‘I don’t believe it’ 
(BBC, 2018). 
 
Just like Trump, Modi also incessantly circulates lies and misleading statements. A telling 
example of a blatant lie, was Modi’s claim that the railway accident in November 2016 near 
Pukhraya, leaving 150 people dead, was a ‘conspiracy planned by people sitting across the 
border’, implicating the Pakistani intelligence service ISI. Local police officials, however, 
denied these claims and stated that the accident was the result of broken tracks, rather than 
sabotage (Singh, 2017). Modi furthermore also frequently exhibits a deep-seated anti-
intellectualism. When Amartya Sen critiqued his governments’ economic policies, he reacted 
by stating that ‘hard work is much more powerful than Harvard’ (Modi, quoted in The Hindu, 
2017: np). The persistent critique and in some instances persecution of Indian intellectuals and 
human rights activists, has also led to the mainstreaming of religiously inspired pseudo-
scientific accounts renouncing the laws of physics as formulated by Newton and Einstein 
(BBC, 2019).  
 
While strategic and persistent lying and an anti-science disposition can be observed across the 
two cases, conspiracy theories seem to be less prevalent within Asian (political) cultures 
compared to Western ones. It is not that Indian neo-fascist politics is devoid of conspiracy 
theories, they are not, but conspiracy theories are much less front and center than is the case in 
Western neo-fascist discourse and the Western psyche (see Aupers, 2012).  
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Anti-Enlightenment and Anti-Democratic Values 
 
A final cluster of nodal points relates to the antagonistic relationship of fascism towards the 
ideals and values of the enlightenment. Enlightenment values include an emphasis on rational 
argument in public debate, promotion of democracy as the maximisation of civic participation, 
the acceptance of freedom and equality as central political principles, as well as the articulation 
of natural or inalienable rights as humans and a spirit of universal fraternity4 (Israel, 2010). 
Given the nature of these values is not surprising that neo-fascist ideology firmly aligns with a 
longstanding anti-enlightenment tradition going against said values (Sternhell, 2010).  
 
However, neo-fascist political actors are not always open and straightforward about their anti-
enlightenment and anti-democratic worldviews. They tend to selectively cherry-pick from 
democratic and enlightenment values, for example, claiming freedom of speech to be a bigoted 
racist, using the ideal of liberty to deny ‘non-natives’ their democratic and human rights, or 
deploying feminist tropes against Muslims. Stanley (2018: 50) argues that ‘[f]ascists have 
always been well acquainted with this recipe for using democracy’s liberties against itself’, 
which was precisely what Popper warned against with his paradox of tolerance. 
 
This quintessentially anti-enlightenment and anti-democratic position is exposed foremost 
when democratic values, principles or laws are impeding their actions. It is at that point that 
they reveal their true anti-democratic credentials. We could refer in this regard to the active 
delegitimization of an independent legislature and the undermining of the rule of law, reflected 
in an ‘impatience with constitutional forms’ and a rejection of ‘the constraints of the law’ to 
their will (Billig, 1989: 147).  
 
Trump consistently delegitimises judges and judicial decision which uphold the human rights 
of refugees and immigrants. In August 2019, the US Department of Justice even filed a petition 
to decertify the National Association of Immigration Judges, a union that has been very vocal 
in its critique of Trump and DoJ’s attempt to turn the immigration judges into immigration 
officers (Goldbaum, 2019). Trump also targets his attacks on the legal and congressional 
investigations into his own or his campaign’s actions. In order to delegitimise the FBI’s 
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 elections, Trump tweeted: ‘This is the single 
greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history’ (@realDonaldTrump, 18 May 2017). 
In fact. all the legal efforts to stop or contest Trump’s anti-democratic actions are persistently 
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denoted by him as a ‘witch hunt’, a metaphor implying unfair persecution. Between the start 
of his presidency and December 2019, Trump tweeted almost 300 times ‘witch hunt’, referring 
both to the Russian interference investigation and the Ukraine impeachment trial (Markham-
Cantor, 2019: np). This incessant repetition is a deliberate tactic, as it can potentially lead to a 
reiteration effect. And sure enough, a March 2019 poll conducted by Suffolk University found 
that half of Americans agreed with the statement that the FBI’s investigation into Russian 
interference in the 2016 US elections amounted to a witch hunt (ibid).  
 
Although India is often heralded as the world’s largest democracy, Modi and his BJP 
government have in recent years hollowed out democracy in India to the extent that is has 
become a democracy in name only. The disdain of democratic principles and values is most 
visible in the way the Indian government and its security forces imposed federal rule in the 
Muslim-majority states of Jammu and Kashmir, disregarding basic human rights and squashing 
all dissent with impunity (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Recently, Modi has also been 
advocating a one nation, one election policy, going against the federalist logic of Indian 
democracy and essentially promoting the centralisation of power in the hands of the central 
government, which is controlled by his own party, the BJP (Begg, 2019).  
 
In the next section I will address the process through which neo-fascist discourse is being 
normalised, which as I will argue inevitably implicates media and communication.  
 
 
The Normalisation of Neo-Fascism through Mediation 
 
Scholars have identified a wide range of demand-side as well as (internal and external) supply-
side explanations for the rise neo-fascist parties and the gradual normalisation of the neo-fascist 
discourse, as deconstructed above (cf. Muis and Immerzeel, 2017). Regarding demand-side 
explanations, we could refer to grievances relating to the disproportionally negative 
consequences of globalisation and neo-liberalism and linked to that the increased tensions 
relating to the emergence of de facto multi-cultural societies, concerns regarding democratic 
deficits of supra-national political institutions, as well as increased inequalities, insecurity and 
fear. Internal supply-side explanations include the charisma of a strong leader as well as the 
organisational strength and mobilising power of neo-fascist parties. Regarding external supply-
side reasons, we could refer to the specific political and institutional context, for example 
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proportional versus majoritarian systems or a regionalist nationalism which can be pitted 
against a more distant federal state. Another important external supply-side explanation is, 
however, the extent to which neo-fascist parties and their leaders are able to exploit the 
mediation opportunity structure – or the dynamic ‘interplay between agentic opportunities and 
structural constraints’ at the level of frame production, self-mediation practices, managing 
mainstream media representations and achieving frame resonance and reception (Cammaerts, 
2018b: 35). This implicates both social media – used by neo-fascist leaders to self-mediate and 
disintermediate, and traditional media – providing a platform to neo-fascist parties and leaders 
in order to amplify their self-mediations. Let me first address the use and role of social media 
and strategies of self-mediation and disintermediation in the propagandistic efforts of neo-
fascist leaders and parties.  
 
Social Media, Self- and Disintermediation 
 
Social media platforms and the algorithms that sustain them, are the quintessential medium of 
the new politics of visibility, they are very apt at ‘carefully managing […] visibility and self-
presentation within the mediated arena of modern politics’ (Thompson, 2005: 41). A telling 
example of this is how a variety of social media platforms have been pivotal in the personal 
branding efforts of Modi and the political communication strategy of his party, the BJP. He is 
one of, if not the, most popular political leader globally on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube and Instagram (Economic Times, 2019). Likewise, Trump is also an avid and popular 
social media user, known for strategically using Twitter to facilitate the ‘rise and 
mainstreaming of divisive and incendiary public discourse’ (Ott, 2017: 66).  
 
Indeed, as many of the examples above demonstrate, central to generating social (as well as 
traditional) media resonance is what could be called a politics of provocation or what Wodak 
(2015: 19) describes as ‘scandalisation’, i.e. a strategy to ‘intentionally provoke scandals by 
violating publicly accepted norms’. This breaking of supposed taboos, often denoted as so-
called political correctness, is designed to create drama, moral indignation and controversy, 
which subsequently translates into more clicks, shares, comments, and opinion pieces, after 
which the neo-fascist provocateurs swiftly reposition themselves from the role of the 
perpetrator into the victim (Cammaerts, 2018a). This aligns with a long-standing cultivation of 
victimhood amongst neo-fascists vis-à-vis the ‘liberal elite’ and those that dare to criticise or 
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contest ‘the will of people’, as articulated and embodied by them (Stanley, 2018). It suffices to 
recall the persistent use of the ‘witch hunt’ trope by Trump in this regard.  
 
It must be noted though that, unlike Trump, Modi and the BJP use a ‘good cop, bad cop’ 
strategy on social media and in public discourse. While Modi often presents a discourse of 
unity, harmony, and peace, and might resort to insinuating dog whistle politics, he leaves the 
explicit politics of hate and provocation to his government ministers, state level officials and 
senior party members. Research found that almost 80% of hate speech incidents in 2017 could 
be attributed to political leaders of the BJP, and this also became worse over time (Shabaz, 
2018), but Modi himself does not often use hate speech or hyperbolic language as Trump 
frequently does, he presents himself more as a smiling cuddly harmless teddy bear rather than 
a macho alpha-bully. 
 
Besides the affordance of self-mediation, social media also enables disintermediation or the 
potential to reduce the number of mediators between the party/leader and the electorate. 
Disintermediation in this context thus above all means the ability to remove (critical) 
journalists from their media strategies and privileging direct channels of communication with 
their followers and the broader electorate.  
 
Social media and their opaque proprietary algorithms have, furthermore, the propensity to 
regulate how information circulates and who gets to see what (Beer, 2017). Neo-fascist 
operators and communication strategists are very apt at exploiting these social media 
algorithms and their affordances (Mazzoleni and Bracciale, 2018). Their highly emotive, 
controversial, and often deliberately transgressive content, as discussed above, is highly likely 
to go viral due to its shock value, but also because both their sympathisers as well as their 
critics tend to share, circulate and engage with it in respectively positive and negative ways, 
which subsequently helps to circulate the neo-fascist discourse and becomes instrumental in 
further amplifying and normalising the neo-fascist discourse.  
 
However, it is not just the number of clicks and emotive engagement that impacts on whether 
social media content resonates or not. Social media platforms also harbour a set of hidden 
affordances (Bucher and Helmond, 2017). The whole business model of social media platforms 
is geared towards matching the digital footprint of our sociability with advertisers, including 
now it seems political actors who are willing and able to pay for it. In other words, it is not just 
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the collective that decides what gets amplified to whom, but also those that have enough 
financial capital to pay for access to those algorithms enabling them to reach targeted and 
segmented groups of social media users. To get a sense of the magnitude of this, between 19 
January 2019 and 16 February 2020, the Trump campaign spent 26 million US$ on Facebook 
ads alone, representing about half of its media spending during that non-election period (Fisher 
and Swan, 2020). Likewise, during the 2019 national election campaign, Modi’s BJP spent 
almost 3 million US$ on social media advertising, mainly through Google, Facebook and its 
affiliates (Chaturvedi, 2019). 
 
Mainstream Media Resonance 
 
Neo-fascist political leaders and parties are, however, also deeply dependent on traditional 
media and journalists ‘to get their message across to potential adherents’ (Muis and Immerzeel, 
2017: 914). Unlike their easy access to and ample use of social media, their relationship with 
traditional mainstream media is much more fraught and contentious. Journalists are generally 
seen as an utter nuisance and positioned as an out-of-touch liberal elite, an enemy of ‘the 
people’, hiding the real truths from ordinary folk. As Trump put it in one of his many tweets 
lambasting the mainstream media: ‘The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, 
@ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!’ 
(@realDonaldTrump, 17 February, 2017). 
 
At the same time, while many journalists might be highly critical of neo-fascist leaders such as 
Trump and Modi, mainstream media also feeds off the emotive spectacle, drama, and outrage 
which neo-fascists generate. This not only leads to the production of more content, but also 
audience engagement with that content, both driving the new business model of contemporary 
media (Nielsen, 2016: 65). This explains why in spite of stringent journalistic critiques and the 
anti-mainstream ‘FAKE NEWS’ media rhetoric of neo-fascist politicians and parties, many 
studies also point to the mainstream media’s complicity in the recent rise of neo-fascism across 
the world (Mazzoleni, 2008; Ellinas, 2009; Vliegenthart et al., 2012; Forchtner et al., 2013; 
Krzyżanowski, 2013; Titley, 2019).  
 
For example, given the celebrity status of contemporary politicians, journalists tend to use the 
social media accounts of neo-fascist leaders as primary source material to produce their media 
content, which in turn feeds the amplification of the neo-fascist discourse. Every provocative 
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tweet of Trump is world news the next day, endlessly being replicated and regurgitated. Besides 
this, and as shown in the analysis above, one of the main counter-tactics used by journalists 
against the neo-fascist politicians’ tendency to persistently lie is to fact-check. However, many 
studies find that if the lie feeds already present misconceptions and pre-suppositions, fact-
checking is not very effective and could even backfire (Nieminen and Rapeli, 2019). 
Furthermore, and speaking to our argument above of positive and negative amplification, 
George Lakoff (quoted in Rosenberg 2017: np) reminds us that ‘if you negate a frame, you 
have to activate the frame, because you have to know what you’re negating. If you use logic 
against something, you are strengthening it’. 
 
As such, both social and news media are central and instrumental actors in facilitating and in 
many instances promoting and even financially profiting from neo-fascism all over the world. 
This raises some serious ethical questions, especially if we bring democratic and normative 
communication theory into the conversation. 
 
 
The antagonism between neo-fascism and democracy and its normative implications for 
social and traditional media 
 
Democracy is unavoidably conflictual as different ideas and visions about the common good, 
about how to organise society, about taxation and redistribution, and about whether to privilege 
equality over liberty or vice versa permanently clash with each other. At the same time, it is 
also the space where solutions, compromises and trade-offs have to be found and made. In 
radical democratic theory, this democratic war of position is denoted as the political whereas 
the solution-oriented aspect of democracy is termed politics (Mouffe, 2005). The dynamic 
interplay between the inherently conflictual nature of the political and the need to seek 
compromises or reach temporary cease-fires in ongoing conflicts is what defines democracy 
and enables change and renewal.  
 
Chantal Mouffe (1999) distinguishes, however, between two distinct types of conflictual 
relationships – antagonistic and agonistic ones. Both are highly relevant to the topic and 
argument developed in this paper. Antagonism relates to a conflictual relationship whereby 
political actors do not accept each other’s legitimacy to exist, they are enemies. Agonism, in 
contrast, requires opposing political actors to consider each other as adversaries that agree to 
Journal of Multi-Cultural Discourses 
 - 16 - 
disagree. The importance of this distinction between antagonism and agonism was made 
apparent in a tweet from the Black American writer and activist Robert Jones Jr. a few years 
ago, when he wrote: ‘We can disagree and still love each other unless your disagreement is 
rooted in my oppression and denial of my humanity and right to exist’ (@SonofBaldwin, 18 
August 2015).  
 
The role of democracy, Mouffe argues, is precisely to turn antagonisms into agonisms. The 
question this raises, however, is to which extent neo-fascism can be engaged with in agonistic 
terms in a democracy? In my view, there exists an existential incompatibility between 
democracy and fascism and this also applies to its contemporary articulation. As Traverso 
(2004: 99) quite rightly and succinctly put it, ‘it is impossible to be democratic […] without 
being at the same time anti-fascist’. This means that there are – and should be – limits to a 
radical pluralist democracy, as Mouffe (2005: 120) herself also acknowledged when she wrote, 
somewhat in line with Popper, that ‘[a] democracy cannot treat those who put its basic 
institutions into question as legitimate adversaries’.  
 
If we thus accept the premise that neo-fascism and democracy are incommensurate and heed 
Popper’s warning of the paradox of intolerance, the logical implication is that democratic 
forces, including traditional and social media, have an ethical duty to protect democracy and 
democratic values against the destructive forces of neo-fascism, especially as ‘[t]he goal of 
fascist propaganda is not merely to mock and sneer at robust and complex public debate about 
policy; it is to eliminate its possibility’ (Stanley, 2018: 75).  
 
There is a long tradition of normative theory when it comes to the roles that media and 
communication have to play in a democracy and which would support a call to arms in the 
democratic fight-back against neo-fascism. A normative theory of the media is embedded in a 
‘philosophy of public communication that sees the mass media as having an essential part to 
play in larger social and cultural processes’ (Christians et al., 2009: 16). We could refer, 
amongst others, to the enlightenment antecedents of both the liberal as well as the social 
responsibility normative tradition, to the need to promote an inclusive and participatory society, 
to the expectations to facilitate an equitable and pluralistic public debate as well as to be the 
fourth estate and critically monitor the powers that be, to protect human rights, and to adhere 
to a set of deontological codes, which guarantees source protection, fact-based reporting, 
exposing abuses of power, etc. It has to be noted though that some of these values and 
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normative ideals are firmly Western and less prevalent in non-Western and more specifically 
Asian cultures, where a collaborative role of the media is emphasised more with an emphasis 
on harmony, cohesion and collectivism (Xiaoge, 2005).  
 
Despite these differences, a set of normative traditions and norms emerge for journalists and 
the media to act and contest, when confronted with exclusions, racism, injustices, and violence, 
in line with human rights and democratic values. Journalists and media are thus approached as 
pivotal actors in ‘the constitution of a democratic social order’, as James Carey (1996: 9) put 
it. This position is most pronounced in the civic journalism tradition, which describes 
journalists as ‘democracy’s cultivators’ (Rosen, 1999: 4), and considers them to have a moral 
duty to ‘help public life go well’ (Merritt, 1995: 113), which inevitable implies combatting 
neo-fascism and its normalisation.  
 
The question of how traditional and social media companies have to protect democracy against 
the rise and normalisation of neo-fascism is ever more pressing, but there are no easy nor 
straightforward solutions here. Let me, however, attempt to provide some tentative suggestions 





As argued above, normative theory places upon traditional media actors a moral duty to protect 
democratic values and human rights rather than being an active pawn in the spread and 
normalization of a racist and nativist neo-fascist discourse. This is, however, easier said than 
done. First of all, the moral resistance against neo-fascism and their politics of provocation is 
integral to the neo-fascist communication strategy and feeds their inter-linked discourse of 
victimhood. It fits the stark polarisation they desire, pitting journalists against ‘the people’ 
thereby creating clear distinctions and boundaries which strengthen the neo-fascist collective 
identity and increase its support-base. In many ways, the threat of the ‘democratic other’, intent 
on impeding the neo-fascist agenda presented as the ‘will of the people’, functions as a potent 
rallying cry. In the context of the Trump presidency, Guardian Journalist Jonathan Freedland 
(2019: np) summarises the conundrum of those that want to protect democracy and counter 
neo-fascism; they  
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face a choice between doing what is morally right and what is politically smart. When 
you’re dealing with an amoral bigot in the White House, those two things are not always 
the same.  
 
This observation points to the need to reflect on whether and/or how to avoid taking the bait 
that is constantly being put out there by neo-fascists to produce an emotive response of moral 
indignation and consternation. This also suggests that we need to develop ways of raising 
critical awareness amongst audiences and citizens, through increasing media literacies to detect 
propaganda and fake news with a view of denaturalising the neo-fascist discourse. However, 
we cannot just lay the responsibility at the doorstep of citizens and individuals. We also need 
to question the business models and practices of today's media, both traditional and social, who 
feed off controversy, drama, and outrage, which tends to lead to more clicks, shares, 
engagement and content creation.  
 
There are differences though between the position and actions of traditional media and news 
media. Whereas the latter tend to be – by and large – critical of neo-fascism, fact-checking neo-
fascists’ lies in line with their normative roles in a democracy, they still feed off and amplify 
the neo-fascist discourse. Social media companies, on the contrary, tend to position themselves 
as neutral conduits of public discourse, claiming to protect free-speech, whilst financially 
profiting from neo-fascist political actors and parties. What the concept of disintermediation 
thus masks, is the obvious observation that social media platforms themselves are the new 
mediators, but with much less accountability and denying the normative responsibilities that 
many traditional media and journalists tend to adhere to in a democracy. This should urgently 
change!  
 
At the same time, the moral duty to combat neo-fascism in its contemporary articulation does 
not lie exclusively with the hybrid information and communication systems in our 
democracies, but as much with broader civil society and democratic politicians and parties, 
who together with traditional and new media actors need to work harder to deepen and 
strengthen democracy, but also importantly to address the demand-side which makes neo-
fascist discourses and policies resonate with so many citizens across the world.  
 
Finally, what the multi-cultural political discourse analysis developed in this article also 
demonstrates is that the various nodes of the neo-fascist discourse operate across both Western 
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and non-Western political cultures in similar as well as diverging manner. Whereas there are 
concurring patterns, represented by the various nodes, there are also marked divergences 
between the US and Indian context. These situate themselves, however, more at the level of 
tone, style and communication strategy, than substance. It is in this regard clear that the lack 
of support for democratic values, practices and human rights from political leaders of major 
democracies in both Western and non-Western contexts, is fuelling and justifying a rise of 
authoritarian rule globally. It has also emboldened and invigorated violent rightwing extremism 
in both contexts, which has become even more vile and hateful, issuing more and more death 
threats, and increasingly acting on those threats.  
 
All this shows that the neo-fascist politics of provocation and the incessant racist and nativist 
discourse propagated by neo-fascist political actors is not without material consequences and 
that democratic societies urgently need to defend themselves more vigorously ‘against the 
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1 Rather than using more sanitised denominations, such as: rightwing populism, new right, 
radical/extreme right or alt-right, I believe it is important to be crystal clear about what we 
are dealing with here in ideological terms and that is, as I will demonstrate, fascism (Stanley, 
2018). 
2 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuNn7JoH4hg  
3 As briefly mentioned in the section on case selection, Modi was also deeply implicated in 
the initiation, incitement and subsequent condonement of the 2002 massacre of Muslims in 
Gujarat, as shown in the 2004 documentary The Final Solution. 
4 Whereas anti-slavery and anti-racism was certainly present amongst the so-called radical 
enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau and Spinoza, it has to be noted though that 
colonialism and racial inequality remained strong in Europe and universality of rights limited 
to white men, leading Mbembe (2010) to rightly critique the hypocrisy at the core of the 
enlightenment. This hypocrisy also makes that enlightenment values, and especially their 
claim to universality, are often more contested and problematised in non-Western than in 
Western contexts.	
	
